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Abstract
Basic games, where each individual chooses between two strategies, illustrate several issues that immediately emerge from
the standard approach that applies strategic reasoning, based on rational decisions, to predict population behavior where
no rationality is assumed. These include how mutual cooperation (which corresponds to the best outcome from the
population perspective) can evolve when the only individually rational choice is to defect, illustrated by the Prisoner’s
Dilemma (PD) game, and how individuals can randomize between two strategies when neither is individually rational,
illustrated by the Battle of the Sexes (BS) game that models male-female conflict over parental investment in offspring. We
examine these questions from an evolutionary perspective where the evolutionary dynamics includes an impulsive effect
that models sudden changes in collective population behavior. For the PD game, we show analytically that cooperation can
either coexist with defection or completely take over the population, depending on the strength of the impulse. By
extending these results for the PD game, we also show that males and females each evolve to a single strategy in the BS
game when the impulsive effect is strong and that weak impulses stabilize the randomized strategies of this game.
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Introduction
A great deal of game-theoretic research has been devoted to
explain the prevalence of cooperation in biological systems as well
as in human society. One reason for the vast literature from
members of the game theory community on this topic is that their
methods do not work for the underlying stage game, the symmetric
Prisoner’s Dilemma, which pits cooperative behavior against its
nemesis of defection. In particular, the only rational option in this
PD stage game is to Defect since this strategy strictly dominates
Cooperate (i.e. a player is better off defecting than cooperating no
matter what the opponent does).
On the other hand, cooperation can be rational when the
payoffs of the PD game are modified by assuming some relatedness
between the players [1,2], by them playing the game an uncertain
number of times [3], or by extending the model to a multi-player
(i.e. more than two) public goods game [4]. These predictions are
often based on applying either static (e.g. evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS)) or dynamic (e.g. the replicator equation) methods
from evolutionary game theory [5] that assumes a large population
of agents paired at random to play the game. Population
interactions that are structured either spatially (e.g. through
nearest neighbors on a lattice) or socially (e.g. through adjacent
nodes in a graph) also enhance the evolution of cooperation [6–11]
as do the stochastic effects of finite populations [12].
To a lesser extent, the question of stability of mixed strategy
equilibrium solutions (and their interpretation) has also created
controversy in the game theory community [13,14]. This is
especially true of two-player non symmetric games due to the
result that, at any evolutionarily stable state of such games, players
must use pure strategies [15]. The controversy here is clearly
demonstrated through typical payoffs used in the Battle of the
Sexes game [5,16,17] introduced into biology by Dawkins [18] to
model the conflict between males and females concerning their
respective contributions to parental investment (see also the Buyer-
Seller game [19] that has the same qualitative payoff structure). In
the BS stage game, each player has two pure strategies and the
only equilibrium solution is for both players to use a mixture of
their strategies. Furthermore, the replicator equation applied to
this game yields periodic solutions around this mixed strategy
equilibrium pair even though Maynard Smith [17] (Chapter 11C)
states that ‘‘I am unable to offer illustrative examples, or evidence
that such cycles occur.’’
In this article, we re-examine the PD and BS stage games from
the dynamic perspective where, in addition to the continuous
trajectories of evolutionary game theory, there are periodic jumps
in the population size. In biological systems, these latter impulsive
perturbations may be due to sudden changes in the physical
environment (e.g. the effects of climate change or natural disaster)
or to intrinsic diurnal/nocturnal and seasonal life history effects in
the physiological and reproductive mechanisms of individuals in
the population. Impulsive perturbations have also been used to
model the effect on human behavior of sudden market corrections
or of sudden shifts in the business cycle [20]. We assume that the
impulsive ‘‘coefficient’’ for an individual depends only on its
strategy and analyze the resultant dynamics. In particular, we give
analytic conditions for the coefficients in the PD game for the
successful initial invasion of Cooperators into a population of
Defectors as well as conditions based on stronger impulsive effects
for Cooperators to completely take over the system. We also show
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 March 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 3 | e9882that these latter conditions applied to the BS game imply global
convergence to a monomorphic system where all males use one
pure strategy as well as all females. Moreover, when impulsive
effects are weak in the BS game, a globally attracting polymorphic
state emerges near the mixed equilibrium pair.
Analysis
Prisoner’s Dilemma
The PD stage game is ubiquitous in the game theory literature
and so needs no introduction. We follow the standard notation by
taking its payoff matrix as
DC
D
C
PT
SR
  
ð1Þ
where TwRwPwS. The entries in this matrix give the payoff to
the row player in a two-player interaction with the column player
(e.g. if a player Defects against an opponent who Cooperates, his
payoff is T). Since TwR and PwS, Defect strictly dominates
Cooperate and so it is the only rational outcome of this one shot
game.
To illustrate how periodic impulses can be combined with an
evolutionary dynamics, suppose that the replicator equation (see
Eq.4a below) models behavioral evolution. From a biological
perspective, these dynamics result from a direct correspondence
between expected payoff and reproductive success [21]. Specifi-
cally, if n1 and n2 are the numbers of Defectors and Cooperators
respectively in the population at time t, then
dn1
dt
~
n1
N
Pn1zTn2 ðÞ ,
dn2
dt
~
n2
N
Sn1zRn2 ðÞ ,
ð2Þ
where N~n1zn2 is the total population size. Here
Pn1=NzTn2=N is the expected payoff to a Defector in a single
interaction with a randomly chosen opponent assuming that
population size is large. From Taylor and Jonker [21], the
population dynamics (Eq.2) implies the frequency p(t) of
Defectors in the population (i.e. p~n1=N) evolves according to
the replicator equation (Eq.4a).
Now suppose that individuals die at periodic intervals t~kt for
k~1,2,3:::. That is, reproductive success (i.e. fitness) in Eq.2
refers only to births. Deaths cause a jump in the solution
trajectories of Eq.2 of the form Dni kt ðÞ ~ni ktz ðÞ {ni kt{ ðÞ
where n1 ktz ðÞ (respectively, n1 kt{ ðÞ ) is the number of Defectors
immediately after (respectively before) the jump. If the death rate
of each strategy type is independent of population size, then
Dni kt ðÞ ~{cini kt{ ðÞ ð 3Þ
for some 0ƒciƒ1. The parameter {ci is called the ‘‘impulsive
coefficient’’ for the i-th strategy. The dynamical system with
periodic impulsive effects combines Eq.2 when t=kt with Eq.3
when t~kt. In particular, for every nonnegative initial condition
n1(0),n2(0) ðÞ , this impulsive dynamical system has a unique
nonnegative solution for all t§0.
Evolutionary game theory is more concerned with the evolution
of strategy frequencies than with how the absolute numbers of
strategy users evolve over time. It is shown in File S1 (see also [22])
that
dp
dt
~p(1{p)( P{S)pz(T{R)(1{p) ðÞ for t=kt ð4aÞ
Dp~p(1{p)
c2{c1
1{pc1{(1{p)c2
for t~kt, k~1,2,3::: ð4bÞ
where Dpk t ðÞ ~pk tz ðÞ {pk t{ ðÞ denotes the jump in p at
moment t~kt. That is, pk tz ðÞ (respectively, pk t{ ðÞ ) is the
frequency of Defector immediately after (respectively before) the
jump. For the analysis of this dynamical system, it is important to
notice that the frequency dynamics Eq.4 is independent of
population size N. When there are no impulsive effects, we have
the standard replicator equation Eq.4a [21]. For this reason, we
call Eq.4 the replicator equation with periodic impulses.
Remark. The replicator equation with periodic impulses
developed above is based on continuous births throughout the
season and deaths only at the end. One consequence of our
assumptions is that birth and death rates are independent of
population size. It can be shown [22] that dynamics Eq.4 also
emerges when birth rates are altered by any strategy-independent
background fitness (which is usually assumed to decrease as
population size increases). This background fitness can be used to
investigate the dynamics of total population size and not only the
frequency dynamics as in the standard approach to evolutionary
game theory [21]. The dynamics Eq.4 also models other periodic
impulses in biological systems such as regular perturbations in the
physical environment. It is well-documented [23–25] that humans
(and other biological species) exhibit more cooperation in the face
of natural disasters (also called the disaster syndrome). Such
shifting of aggregate population behavior through individuals
changing their strategy becomes a positive jump in the proportion
of Cooperators. In fact, any impulsive coefficients in Eq.3
satisfying ciƒ1 are suitable since ni(t)§0 for all t in this case.
The interpretation of civ0 is that the impulse is then beneficial to
the i-th strategy.
From Eq.4a, p strictly increases during the season (i.e.
dp=dtw0)i f0vpv1 since PwS and TwR. Thus, if the
Defector death rate is no higher than the Cooperator (i.e. c1ƒc2),
the population must evolve to all Defect since p also increases at
the end of each season. However, if the death rates benefit
Cooperators (i.e. if c1wc2), the effect of Defector deaths may offset
their higher birth rates and so it is unclear which effect dominates
(see Figure 1). In the extreme case where c1~1, all Defectors die
at the end of the first season and the population is all Cooperate
thereafter.
For these reasons, we will assume that 1wc1wc2 for the
remainder of this section. The key to understanding the outcome
in this scenario is to determine the stability of the boundary
equilibria p~0 and p~1 of Eq.4. Heuristically, when p is near 0,
the trajectory p(t) during the first season is approximated by
p(t)~p(0)e(T{R)t since, from Eq.4a, dp=dt&(T{R)p. Also,
from Eq.4b, the jump at the end of this season is
Dp&p t{ ðÞ c2{c1 ðÞ = 1{c2 ðÞ . For (asymptotic) stability of all
Cooperate (i.e. for p(t) to converge to 0 if it is initially close to
0), we expect that p tz ðÞ ~p(0)e T{R ðÞ t 1z c2{c1 ðÞ = 1{c2 ðÞ ðÞ
vp(0). This is true if and only if
(T{R)tvln
1{c2
1{c1
: ð5Þ
Cooperation through Impulses
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are payoff matrices with TwR for which all Cooperate is stable.
It is proved analytically in File S1 (see also [22]) that p~0 is
stable if inequality Eq.5 is true and unstable (i.e. pt ðÞdiverges
from 0 if it is initially close) if this inequality is reversed (i.e.
T{R ðÞ twln 1{c2 ðÞ = 1{c1 ðÞ ðÞ ). It is also shown there that all
Defect is stable if
(P{S)twln
1{c2
1{c1
ð6Þ
and unstable if the inequality is reversed. In fact, the dynamic
stability of the boundary equilibria for threshold parameters when
Eq.5 or Eq.6 is an equality is also characterized there. Besides
one exceptional case discussed in the final paragraph of this section
when both Eq.5 and Eq.6 are equalities, there is a unique interior
t-periodic trajectory (i.e. a p (t) with 0vp (t)v1 for all t§0 and
p  ktz ðÞ ~p (0) for all k~1,2,3,:::) if and only if either both
boundary equilibria are unstable or both are stable. In the first
(respectively, second) case, p (t) is globally stable (respectively,
unstable). Finally, if exactly one boundary equilibrium is stable,
then it is globally stable in that it attracts all interior trajectories.
These analytic results from File S1, that are summarized in the
preceding paragraph, are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 for non
threshold cases. In Figure 1, trajectories of Eq.4 are given for fixed
payoff parameters and four different values of
C:
1
t
ln 1{c2 ðÞ = 1{c1 ðÞ ðÞ : ð7Þ
In Figure 2, Cw0 is fixed and the stability of boundary equilibria
and interior t-periodic trajectories is characterized in different
regions of the space with parameters T{R and P{S.
For small values of C, the population evolves to all Defect
(Figs. 1a and 1b). An initial small population of Cooperators can
successfully invade a population of Defectors once P{S ðÞ vC.
Cooperators then completely take over the population if inequality
T{R ðÞ vC also holds (Fig. 1d and quadrant III in Fig. 2);
otherwise the system approaches a globally stable t-periodic state
consisting of a mixture of Cooperators and Defectors (Fig. 1c and
quadrant IV in Fig. 2). If P{S ðÞ wC as in quadrants I and II of
Figure 2, either all Defect completely takes over or we have a
bistable situation where all Cooperate can persist if their initial
frequency is sufficiently high.
It is instructive to consider the case of small impulsive effects (i.e.
when the impulsive coefficients c1wc2 are both close to 0). By
Taylor’s expansion, ln 1{c2 ðÞ = 1{c1 ðÞ ðÞ is approximately equal
to c1{c2. Then Eq.7 becomes
C% c1{c2 ðÞ =t,
which represents the average impulsive effect over one season in
Figure 1. Trajectories for the replicator equation with periodic impulses (4) when payoffs T, R, P, S of the PD game are fixed
at 10, 5, 3, 0 respectively and the initial frequency of Defect is p(0)~0:5. Here t~0:1 and the values taken for C are (a) 0; (b) 2;( c )4; and (d)
6.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009882.g001
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payoff advantage during the season to Defect over Cooperate is
always less than this average impulsive effect (i.e. if T{R and
P{S are both less than C), Cooperators invade and take over the
population. This intuitive result can be generalized to all situations
where impulsive effects are nearly equal (i.e. c1 is close to c2 but
they are not necessarily close to 0) (see also File S1). The central
message here is that a small difference in the death rates of
Cooperators and Defectors can have a major impact on the
evolution of cooperation.
In fact, if we call C defined in Eq.7 the average impulsive effect
over one season in favor of Cooperate for any choice of c1wc2, the
intuitive result of the previous paragraph remains true.
In the exceptional case where T{R~C~P{S, the boundary
equilibria are neutrally stable and every trajectory p(t) for any
initial condition 0vp(0)v1 is t-periodic. Interestingly, the special
payoffs for the PD game that satisfy T{R~P{S have attained
prominence recently since this class includes the simplified PD
games [1,26] with payoff matrix
DC
D
C
0 b
{cb {c
  
ð8Þ
Here b is the payoff benefit a player interacting with a Cooperator
gains and c is the cost paid by Cooperators. Under the usual
assumption that bwcw0, the entries in this simplified payoff
matrix have the same ordering as in Eq.1. From Eq.5 and Eq.6,
if cvC (respectively, cwC), then all Cooperate (respectively, all
Defect) is the final outcome. Unlike other studies on the simplified
PD game [26] where the emergence of Cooperative behavior often
depends on the cost-benefit ratio b=c, here it depends only on the
cost of Cooperation. The size of the payoff benefit has no impact
on our results since neither the replicator equation Eq.4a nor the
impulse Eq.4b depends on b. In our model, it is the impulsive
benefit C that replaces the payoff benefit b. In particular,
Cooperation emerges if and only if the impulsive benefit to
Cooperators is greater than the cost paid by Cooperators. That is,
periodic impulses that favor cooperation provide a mechanism
that promotes the evolution of cooperation.
Battle of the Sexes
In the BS stage game, male strategies are either ‘‘faithful’’ or
‘‘philandering’’ and females are ‘‘coy’’ or ‘‘fast’’ [18]. In the
following two paragraphs, we briefly summarize well-known facts
about this game [5,16,17].
If parental investment costs C, the benefit gained from an
offspring is G and the cost of a long engagement is E, then the
payoffs to males and females are given in the following bimatrix
(e.g. a philanderer receives the benefit G against a fast female
whose net payoff is then G{C).
coy fast
philander
faithful
0, 0 G, G{C
G{
C
2
{E, G{
C
2
{EG {
C
2
, G{
C
2
0
@
1
A ð9Þ
With the usual assumptions that these payoffs satisfy
0vEvGvCv2 G{E ðÞ , the characteristic feature of the BS
game is the cyclical character of male and female best responses. If
females are coy, it pays males to be faithful; if males are faithful, it
pays females to be fast; if females are fast, it pays males to philander;
and if males philander, it pays females to be coy. This characteristic
also leads to cycling in the standard evolutionary dynamics that is
concerned with the evolution of strategy frequencies.
Let p be the frequency of philanders in the male population and
q be the frequency of coy females in their population. The
bimatrix replicator equation is then
dp
dt
~p 1{p ðÞ C=2{qG {E ðÞ ðÞ ð 10aÞ
dq
dt
~q 1{q ðÞ {pG {E{C ðÞ {E ðÞ : ð10bÞ
This two-dimensional dynamics on the unit square has the unique
interior equilibrium p ,q  ðÞ ~ E= C{GzE ðÞ , C=2 G{E ðÞ ðÞ and
all trajectories are periodic orbits surrounding p ,q  ðÞ [5,16,17].
Figure 3a-b illustrates a typical trajectory of Eq.10 for the payoffs.
coy fast
philander
faithful
0, 0 15, {5
2, 2 5,5
  
considered by Dawkins [18] that has p ,q  ðÞ ~(3=8,5=6).
We again assume that trajectories of the replicator equation are
based on male and female births throughout the season and that
there are jumps at t~kt for k~1,2,3,::: due to deaths at the end
of the season. If the male (respectively, female) death rate is ci
(respectively, yi) for their i-th strategy, these latter periodic
impulses are
Dp~p 1{p ðÞ Up ðÞ ð 11aÞ
Dq~q 1{q ðÞ Vq ðÞ ð 11bÞ
Figure 2. Regions of payoff parameter space determined by a
fixed positive value of C in Eq.7. In region I, T{R§C and
P{S§C, and all Defect is globally stable; in region II, T{RvC and
P{SwC, both all Cooperate and all Defect are (locally) stable, and
there exists an unstable t-periodic solution; in region III, T{RƒC and
P{SƒC, and all Cooperate is globally stable; and in region IV,
T{RwC and P{SvC, both all Cooperate and all Defect are unstable,
and there exists a globally stable t-periodic solution corresponding to a
mixture of Cooperators and Defectors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009882.g002
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PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 March 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 3 | e9882Figure 3. Trajectories for the bimatrix replicator equation with periodic impulses for the BS game in the p-q phase plane, where p(t)
and q(t) are represented by blue and red curves, respectively. The parameters are taken as E~3,G~15,C~20,c2~y2~0 and t~0:1, i.e.,
the payoff matrix is
coy fast
philander
faithful
0, 0 15, {5
2, 2 5,5
  
and the neutral interior equilibrium is p ,q  ðÞ ~(3=8,5=6). The minimum period Tmin is about 4p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
G{E ðÞ C{GzE ðÞ
EC C{G ðÞ 2 G{E ðÞ {C ðÞ
s
&3:55. In Figure 3a–b,
c1~y1~0 (no impulses) and the time step is from 1 to 15. All the interior trajectories are periodic orbits surrounding p ,q  ðÞ . In Figure 3c, c1~0:1 and
y1~{0:5 (strong impulses) and the time step is from 1 to 3. Since G{
C
2
{Ew{Cm and Ev{Cf, from Table 1, boundary equilibrium 0,1 ðÞ is
stable and all the interior trajectories converge to 0,1 ðÞ . In Figure 3d, c1~y1~0:005 (weak impulses) and the time steps are respectively 1 to 10,
1z105 to 10z105 and 1z106 to 10z106. All the interior trajectories converge to an attracting set within 0.015 of the interior equilibrium p ,q  ðÞ .I n
Figure 3e–f, c1~y1~0:3 (intermediate impulses) and the time step is from 1 to 15. Clearly, interior trajectories do not always evolve to either a
boundary equilibrium or to a set close to p ,q  ðÞ .
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009882.g003
Cooperation through Impulses
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Vq ðÞ : y2{y1 ðÞ = 1{y1q{y2 1{q ðÞ ðÞ . The bimatrix replicator
equation with periodic impulses combines Eq.10 at t=kt with
Eq.11 at t~kt.
The analysis of this impulsive dynamical system is more difficult
than the replicator equation with periodic impulses for the PD
game. We will assume that civ1 and yiv1 for i~1,2. Each edge
of the unit square is then invariant (as is the interior of the square).
For example, on the edge where q~0, we have
dp
dt
~
p 1{p ðÞ C
2
Dp~p 1{p ðÞ Up ðÞ :
This impulsive dynamics is the same as that for the PD game with
simplified payoffs Eq.8 given by bwc~C=2.
That is, on the edge where all females are fast, the game is one
where males are playing a simplified PD game among themselves.
Thus, all males will eventually be faithful if they have a lower
death rate than philanderers (i.e., c2vc1) that satisfies C=2vCm
where Cm:ln 1{c2 ðÞ = 1{c1 ðÞ ðÞ =t is the impulsive benefit for
faithful males (cf. the discussion in the PD section about Eq.7). If
Cmv0, it is an impulsive benefit for philandering males. On the
other hand, philanderers will take over if their death rate is lower
or if C=2wCm. In this section, we will not consider threshold
parameter values where all trajectories on an edge are t-periodic.
Similarly, on the edge where all males are faithful, there is a
simplified PD game among females (where c is now identified with
{E). Let Cf be the impulsive benefit for fast females (i.e.,
Cf:ln 1{y2 ðÞ = 1{y1 ðÞ ðÞ =t). Thus, all females will eventually be
fast (respectively, coy) if the cost of a long engagement is greater
than (respectively, less than) the impulsive benefit for coy females,
i.e. Ew{Cf) (respectively, Ev{Cf).
In fact, p,q ðÞ ~ 0,0 ðÞ will be stable for the bimatrix replicator
equation with periodic impulses (Eq.10 and Eq.11) on the unit
square if males are eventually faithful on the first edge and females
are eventually fast on the second edge. This result is indicated in
the first row of Table 1 that summaries the stability of all four
vertices of the unit square. The proof is in File S1 where it is also
shown that, if one vertex is stable, then it is globally stable (i.e. all
trajectories in the interior of the unit square converge to it). In
particular, at most one vertex can be stable.
From Table 1, if impulsive effects are strong enough on any
edge to reverse the flow of the replicator equation Eq.10 there
(i.e., if any of the inequalities CmwC=2, CfwC{G,
Cmv{ G{C=2{E ðÞ ,o rCfv{E are true), then there is a
globally stable pure strategy pair for males and females. In
particular, these periodic impulses have removed the characteristic
interior cycles of the BS game and replaced them with global
stability at a vertex. Figure 3c illustrates a typical trajectory of
Eq.10, Eq.11 when one of the stability conditions for the vertex
(1,0) in Table 1 are satisfied.
When impulses are not strong (i.e. when
{(G{C=2{E)vCmvC=2 and {EvCfvC{G), the limiting
behavior of each trajectory on the boundary of the unit square is
the same whether or not periodic impulses Eq.11 are combined
with the bimatrix replicator dynamics; namely, all these
trajectories evolve to the first vertex encountered in a counter-
clockwise direction. On the other hand, no interior trajectory
evolves to a point on the boundary. Figure 3e–f illustrates a typical
trajectory when impulses are of intermediate strength. Notice that
this trajectory does not surround (p ,q ) since the impulses occur
before it has enough time to do so. In fact, through simulations (see
File S1), it is apparent that the properties of such trajectories are
quite complex with multiple t-periodic solutions possible. The
number N of these solutions appears to depend linearly on the
ratio of t to the minimum period Tmin of interior periodic cycles of
the bimatrix replicator dynamics Eq.10 in that it is approximated
by N~2 t=Tmin ½  z1 where [ ] is the integer part of a positive real
number. Proofs of these conjectures suggested by simulations are
beyond the current techniques available to analyze these impulsive
systems. We are hopeful that game-theoretic intuition will extend
these techniques in future research and, in the process, improve
our understanding of how arbitrary periodic impulses affect the
evolutionary dynamics, especially for non symmetric two-player
games (such as the BS game) with a unique equilibrium in the
interior of the strategy space.
Finally, for weak impulses (i.e. for Cm and Cf bothclose to 0 and at
least one nonzero) with tvvTmin, simulations show that all interior
trajectories evolve to a small neighborhood of (p ,q ) (see Figure 3d).
Specifically, although the limiting behavior is not exactly the interior
equilibrium, the large periodic cycles of the bimatrix replicator
dynamics are replaced by orbits that become arbitrarily close to this
equilibrium as the impulsive effect weakens. In fact, except for the one
t-periodic solution, it appears that all trajectories approach the single
orbit in Figure 3d (which is not t-periodic).
In summary, both strong and weak impulsive effects promote
stability in BS games. Strong impulses imply the system has a
globally stable outcome where all males adopt the same strategy as
do all females (i.e. both sexes exhibit monomorphic behavior). On
the other hand, weak impulses eliminate the wild fluctuations
typical of the periodic cycles of the bimatrix replicator dynamics
Eq.10 and replace them with an attracting set near its interior
equilibrium that consists of a stable polymorphic population of
males and females.
Results and Discussion
Our model combining periodic impulses with an evolutionary
dynamics is based on several simplifying assumptions. First,
population sizes are assumed to be sufficiently large that stochastic
effects due to finite populations are ignored in the deterministic
dynamics and fitness is given by expected payoff as in the original
development of the replicator equation [21]. Our assumption that
death rates depend only on strategy type then implies total
population size does not influence the evolution of strategy
frequencies given by our replicator equation with periodic
impulses. Moreover, in the BS game, we have adopted the
unstated common assumption of evolutionary game theory applied
to asymmetric games with a bimatrix payoff matrix [5] that
Table 1. Stability of Boundary Equilibria p,q ðÞ (p is the
frequency of males who philander and q is the frequency of
coy females).
Boundary Equilibrium p,q ðÞ
Conditions for Stability of
Boundary Equilibrium
0,0 ðÞ C
2
vCm and Ew{Cf
1,0 ðÞ C
2
wCm and C{GvCf
0,1 ðÞ
G{
C
2
{Ew{Cm and Ev{Cf
1,1 ðÞ
G{
C
2
{Ev{Cm and C{GwCf
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009882.t001
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between different types of individuals.
The analysis of the effects of periodic impulses becomes more
complex when finite populations and/or unequal population sizes
of different types in asymmetric games are included. In particular,
the dynamics of total population size must then be taken into
account. From this perspective, our analysis of the frequency
effects of periodic impulses can be viewed as a base model against
which these more complex systems can be compared, in much the
same way that the replicator equation of evolutionary game theory
has served as a means to gain an intuitive understanding of
behavioral evolution. Our analytic results, that characterize when
periodic impulses favoring cooperation in the PD game can
overcome the selective advantage of defection and when both
strong and weak impulses have a stabilizing effect in the BS game,
can then be tested (perhaps numerically) to see if they continue to
hold in more complicated models that do not satisfy our
simplifying assumptions.
Supporting Information
File S1 Supporting information for ‘‘Stability and Cooperation
through Periodic Impulses’’.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0009882.s001 (1.03 MB
DOC)
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